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An Estimate of the TNT-Equivalent Net Explosive Quantity
(NEQ) of the Beirut Port Explosion Using Publicly-Available
Tools and Data
Chris Stennett,*[a] Sally Gaulter,[a] and Jackie Akhavan[a]
Abstract: Publicly available video recordings of the ex-
plosion in Beirut on August 4, 2020, were examined and
from them it was possible, in conjunction with the well-
known Google Maps website, to obtain estimates for the lo-
cations of the observers’ cameras with respect to the blast,
and estimates for the blast wave arrival time. A publicly-
available blast wave calculator was then used to estimate
the size of the explosion in terms of the equivalent quantity
of TNT that would produce the same blast wave arrival
time at the observers’ distance. This work estimates the Bei-
rut explosion to have been equivalent to 637 tons TNT,
with a lower bound estimate of 407 tons and an upper
bound estimate of 936 tons.
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1 Introduction
In August 2020, a fire and explosion occurred in a dockside
building in the Port of Beirut. Soon after, it became appa-
rent that a large quantity (estimated at 2750 tons) of am-
monium nitrate had been stored in the building, and it was
determined that this was the material that had exploded. In
this respect, the Beirut explosion is similar to another event
that occurred in Toulouse on 21st September 2001 [1],
though in that case ~300 tons of ammonium nitrate were
stored. Unlike the Toulouse explosion, however, there are
several videos of the Beirut blast circulating, and this most
likely because many observers were already filming the pre-
ceding fire, and so had cameras running at the instant of
the explosion.
Kingery & Bulmash [2] collated experimental data from
TNT test firings, which have since been compiled into useful
blast parameter calculators. Several such calculators exist,
for example, the CONWEP programme (which has been in
use since 1992); or, more recently, UN SaferGuard [3] web-
based calculator. In all of these tools, basic operation allows
the user to enter a charge weight and range to blast, and
the calculator then produces data, based on the original
TNT experiments, for the shock wave parameters, such as
the peak overpressure; impulse; shock wave velocity; and
shock arrival time. CONWEP has additional flexibility, to al-
low the user to input two different shock parameters, from
which the remainder can be found: for example, one can
enter a peak overpressure and charge size, and the soft-
ware then determines the range at which that pressure
would be experienced.
Here we describe some approximate methods by which
the evidence from such videos may be used to estimate the
range of the observer from the blast at the port, the shock
wave arrival time. These estimates can be used in con-
junction with a suitable blast wave calculator to estimate
the TNT-equivalent explosive charge size of the Beirut ex-
plosive event.
2 Experimental
2.1 Estimating the Position of the Blast
The position of the centre of the blast is not easily esti-
mated, mainly because the development of the explosion
within the storage building was complex and unobserved.
It is therefore not clear from which point the explosion be-
gan, nor its direction, nor when full detonation had been
achieved. In this paper, it is therefore assumed that the cen-
tre of the blast is taken as the geometric centre of the
building known to contain the stored ammonium nitrate.
Google Maps has a useful feature which displays the lat-
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itude and longitude of a user-selected point on an aerial
photographic overlay on a map. Using this tool, the centre
of the building, and hence the assumed centre of the blast,
is (33.901434 N, 35.518966E).
Visual analysis of publicly-available video evidence can
be made using one of the many video player applications
freely available, and in this work, the application ‘Avidemux’
(https://avidemux.org/) was used because it has a con-
venient time-from-start display calculated from the video
frame rate, and allows extraction of the audio track for sep-
arate examination.
2.2 Estimating the Position of the Observer
The observer’s position can be found using details seen in
the video records. For example, one video, referred to here
as ‘1TRiSng’, shows a viewpoint from the passenger side of
a car travelling along a road, initially with the fire at the
port facility visible in the distance. The ‘Street View’ feature
in Google Maps allows roadside features seen on the video
to be identified clearly, thus fixing the position of the car in
this case. An example of this is given in Figure 1, showing a
frame from the video at ~0.5 seconds prior to the ex-
plosion, next to a Google Street View image looking north
from the corresponding location on highway 51 in Beirut.
These images show good agreement in fixed details such as
the apparent angle of the tall building in the distance ad-
jacent to the site of the blast; a street sign and bush; and,
the grassy region adjacent to the road. This information can
fix the position of the car at position (33.896351 N,
35.518557E) at the instant of the explosion, with a small un-
certainty of �10 m.
Note that the car is in motion during the ‘1TRiSng’ vid-
eo, and so this could be a source of uncertainty in the posi-
tion estimate. However, assuming a road speed of approx-
imately 20 ms  1 (~45 mph or 72 kmh  1), and taking a shock
arrival time of ~1 second (which will be discussed later) the
car had likely changed position along its trajectory by
around 20 m during passage of the blast wave to the car.
Note, however, that the road route at this position runs ap-
proximately perpendicular to the line joining the car and
the explosion so that the change in car position would
change the distance to the explosion only slightly.
In another video, designated ‘zykkj6’ the stationary ob-
server’s viewpoint is from a terrace bar and is approx-
imately 1100 m from the blast. In this case, it was possible
to identify bars and restaurants in the likely vicinity of the
observer from the Google Maps view and to examine cus-
tomer photographs from the publicity websites of these
businesses. This allowed identification of the viewpoint, in
this case on the terrace of the ‘Clap Beirut Restaurant’.
Again, the line of the terrace bar, in this case, runs perpen-
dicular to the line-of-sight to the explosion, so that un-
certainty in position of the observer within this bar would
change the position only by a small amount.
In some videos, however, the determination of the ob-
server’s location is more subjective. For example, the early
part of the ‘zg9oal’ video allows straightforward identi-
fication of the building from which the video was taken, in
this case, an apartment building close to the Pharmacie du
Quartier. Further, given a direct line of sight to the ex-
plosion, observer must have been on the north side of the
building. However, the viewpoint is quite high but it is not
possible to accurately determine the altitude of the ob-
server, nor their exact position within the building. Fur-
thermore, using the Google Maps view with the aerial pho-
tograph overlay, it is noted that tall buildings are often
shown from a slightly oblique viewpoint, making it difficult
to accurately place the observer at their ground-level equiv-
alent position. These difficulties require that a larger un-
certainty in range-to-explosion be assigned to this, and sim-
ilar observations.
2.3 Estimating the Shock Arrival Time
The videos run from a short time before the explosion, so
that the instant of the explosion can be found, limited by
the accuracy of the camera frame exposure length. In most
mobile telephone devices, the frame rate is 30 fps, and
though the exposure time depends on the camera settings,
it can be no longer than 33 ms; since detailed information
of the actual exposure time is not present in all of the video
records, timing uncertainty is taken here as the longest ex-
posure time, i. e. 33 ms.
Figure 1. Left: Still image from the 1TRiSng video, showing the view
from the moving vehicle window ~0.5 s prior to the initial ex-
plosion flash. Right: Google Street View of a position on highway 51
in Beirut, approximately 50 m north west of the Zuhair Murad
Building. Common features such as the bush (A), street sign (B) and
end of raised grassy area (C) corroborate the location in the video
with the position seen on Google Street View.
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There is visual evidence for the arrival of the blast wave
seen in the videos, which can be used to determine its ar-
rival time. For example, in the ‘1TRiSng’ video, the car win-
dow was broken by the blast wave, and glass fragments are
seen. In this case, the video frame at which glass breaking
occurs was taken as the blast arrival time, subject to the
frame exposure duration uncertainty described above.
However in other videos visual diagnostic evidence is not
as clear, for example in the ‘mcy28 f ‘video taken from a po-
sition approximately 2000 m from the blast.
The videos also contain an audio track, which can be ex-
tracted and examined using an audio analysis application,
which in this work was called ‘Audacity’. In this tool, the
waveform of the audio track is visually represented, and the
sound of the arrival of the blast wave is then clearly visible
as a step change in the waveform amplitude. The ‘Audacity’
application allows the time since the beginning of the au-
dio sequence to be measured, which is limited by the sam-
pling resolution of the recording device, typically 44.8 kHz.
However, selection of the portion of the wave representing
the blast arrival is somewhat subjective, so that this method
is less certain than the high sampling rate would imply. Fur-
thermore, in some audio tracks, there is evidence of several
distinct impulse sounds, which are potentially due to wave
reflections from surfaces in the vicinity of the observer, or
possibly even sampling compression artefacts. We, there-
fore, retain the timing uncertainty of 33 ms, as indicated for
video frame timing resolution.
2.4 Distance from Observer to Blast
Once the observers positions were found, in the form of six-
figure latitude/longitude grid references, a web-based tool
[4] was used to find the distance from the blast centre to
the observer. The estimated uncertainty in the observer po-
sition and the centre of blast position were then applied to
this range to give an upper and lower estimate of observer
range for each of the video observations.
2.5 Calculation of TNT-Equivalent NEQ
Given the measurements for the distance of each observer
from the blast, and the shock wave arrival time relative to
the instant of explosion, the UN ‘SaferGuard’ web-based
calculator was used to calculate the explosion NEQ in terms
of a TNT-equivalent charge size. Limitations of the Safe-
rGuard tool meant that it was necessary to repeatedly cal-
culate shock arrival times for different input charge sizes,
refining the charge size required to obtain the observed
shock arrival time at the observer’s range from the ex-
plosion.
This iterative procedure was performed for the upper
and lower estimates of distance to each observer, at the
central estimates of shock arrival time, and was again per-
formed at the central estimates of observer distance, for the
upper and lower estimates of shock arrival time. This gave,
for each observed record, a range estimate of TNT charge
sizes that could have produced the observed arrival times
at observed distances.
3 Results and Discussion
3.1 Estimates of NEQ
Table 1 summarises the estimates of observer distance. The
‘Observer latitude’ and ‘Observer Longitude’ columns allow
the reader to locate the approximate observer positions us-
ing Google Maps or similar but do not include uncertainty
in position. In our work, different workers provided their
best estimate of position according to the methodology
above, and the uncertainty in observer position is captured
in the ‘Estimated uncertainty in range’ column. Table 2
gives the estimates of wave arrival time, including the un-
certainties discussed above. Table 3 gives the minimum,
maximum and central estimates of the TNT equivalent
charge size for the explosion that would produce the esti-
mated arrival time at the estimated distance.
The central estimate of blast size seems to become larg-
er at shorter ranges to the blast. This is partly explained by
the uncertainty in arrival time, which is always fixed at the
inter-frame time of the recording camera. For close ranges,
and consequent short arrival times, this uncertainty is pro-
Table 1. Observer’s estimated position, and range to blast.




mcy82f.mp4 [5] 33.896292 35.540627 1996 10
zg9oal.mp4 [6] 33.889115 35.516197 1374 20
zykkj6.mp4 [7] 33.897752 35.507118 1168 15
xmmoa7.mp4 [8] 33.896182 35.522357 655 20
1TRiSng.mp4 [9] 33.896351 35.518557 566 10
DASH_1080.mp4 [10] 33.903115 35.523928 510 15
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portionally larger: for example, the frame-duration un-
certainty in timing is ~3% in the ‘1TRiSng’ record, but
~0.6% for the ‘mcy82f’ record.
Nevertheless, the central estimates of blast size are sim-
ilar for ranges from 510 to 1168 m, being close to
630,000 kg whereas at longer ranges they are larger, and
this is likely due the difference in air temperature on the
day of the explosion (reported to be 30 °C at 1800 hrs),
compared to the normalised temperatures used in the blast
wave calculator. All calculations in this work, being based
on the same base data set, are normalised to air temper-
ature of 288.15 K.
Figure 2 shows the calculated shock wave speed from
the UN SaferGuard calculator, for a 600,000 kg TNT event
size. The calculated shock wave speed decreases rapidly
from ~2000 ms  1 towards the acoustic wave speed in air of
343 ms  1 at ranges beyond ~500 m. It is well known that
the acoustic wave speed in air increases with increasing
temperature, and on the day of the explosion would be
351 ms  1. This means that for the longer range observers at
1374 m and 1986 m, the blast wave propagated approx-
imately acoustically for ~50% and ~75% of its trajectory
respectively, and would have travelled more quickly than
the SaferGuard calculator assumes. Hence, to reproduce the
observed arrival time, it would be necessary to choose a
larger charge size in the SaferGuard Calculator.
The TNT equivalence of ammonium nitrate is variously
reported in the literature: Merrifield and Roberts [11] gave a
figure of 56%, whereas a more detailed analysis by
Braithwaite [12] revised this to a theoretical maximum of
42%.
The average of the estimates of TNT-equivalent charge
size that explain the observed, blast effects calculated here
to be ~637 tons, can be approximately translated into an
equivalent mass of AN that contributed to the Beirut ex-
plosion. Taking the equivalence to be 42% implies that
1515 tons (or ~55%) of the 2750 tons of stored material
contributed to the observed blast effects, while the re-
mainder did not.
There is some similarity to the explosion of 2001 in Tou-
louse, for which the summary report [1] suggests that 40 to
80 tons of the stored AN underwent detonation and there-
fore produced blast effects. This corresponds to 13 to 26%
of the total stored quantity of material.
In both Toulouse and Beirut, it is clear that the blast ef-
fects were less than the total stored quantity of ammonium
nitrate would suggest, but that the more recent event was
proportionally larger than the Toulouse event. The mecha-
nistic reason for the discrepancy between the stored mate-
rial quantity and the resulting event size is beyond the
scope of this work, though theoretical study of this aspect
of large-scale ammonium nitrate explosions is ongoing.
Table 2. Estimates of wave travel times.
Video link Central estimat








mcy82f.mp4 5.077 5.044 5.110
zg9oal.mp4 3.294 3.261 3.327
zykkj6.mp4 2.719 2.686 2.752
xmmoa7.mp4 1.303 1.270 1.336
1TRiSng.mp4 1.067 1.034 1.100
DASH_1080.mp4 0.917 0.884 0.950
Table 3. Estimates of TNT equivalent blast size.












mcy82f.mp4 512,000 860,000 669,000
zg9oal.mp4 407,000 989,000 647,000
zykkj6.mp4 410,500 920,000 625,000
xmmoa7.mp4 344,000 1,068,500 632,000




Average 406,917 963,750 637,383
Figure 2. Calculated shock wave velocity and calculated wave arriv-
al time as a function of range to blast, for a 600,000 kg charge size
at 288.15 K and 101.3 kPa. Calculations made with the UN Safe-
rGuard calculator.
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4 Conclusion
It was possible to take advantage of additional details visi-
ble in publicly available video records of the Beirut ex-
plosion, in combination with information from Google
Street view and other public sources, to determine the posi-
tion of the observer’s camera with an accuracy of 10 to
20 m. The limited timing accuracy offered by the standard
frame rate in these video records means that, although
blast wave arrival times can be estimated, these must be
assigned a suitably large uncertainty.
Using a blast wave properties calculator, and given the
distance to blast and time of arrival information extracted
from the video records, it was possible to obtain estimates
for the size of the Beirut explosion in terms of an equivalent
quantity of TNT. A minor limitation of the blast calculators
(and similar ones based on the same data) was identified, in
that these calculators assumed an air temperature of 288 K,
whereas in Beirut the temperature, and hence the acoustic
wave speed, was higher than assumed by the calculator.
Six independent video records, ranging from 510 m to
~2000 m from the blast, were used to make these esti-
mates, and there is reasonable correspondence between all
of them. This work estimates the explosion in Beirut as
equivalent to ~637 tons of TNT, with a lower bound of
~407 tons and an upper bound of ~960 tons. This estimate
is higher than but comparable to that estimated for a sim-
ilar explosion in Toulouse in 2001.
Data Availability Statement
The data that support the findings of this study are openly
available in the internet sources referred to in the paper.
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